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Abstract
A key policy issue is whether bank bailouts weaken or strengthen market discipline.
We address this by analyzing how bank bailouts influence deposit quantities and
prices of recipients versus other banks. Using the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) bailouts, we find both deposit quantities and prices decline, consistent
with substantially reduced demand for deposits by bailed-out banks that dominate
market discipline supply effects. Main findings are robust to numerous checks and
endogeneity tests. However, diving deeper into depositor heterogeneity suggests
nuances. Increases in uninsured deposits, transactions deposits, and deposits in
banks that repaid bailout funds early suggest some temporary limited support for
weakened market discipline.
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“Of course, market discipline can only limit moral hazard to the extent that debt and equity holders
believe that, in the event of distress, they will bear costs. In the crisis, the absence of an adequate
resolution process for dealing with a failing SIFI left policymakers with only the terrible choices of a
bailout or allowing a potentially destabilizing collapse.”
“The Crisis as a Classic Financial Panic,” Remarks by Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System at the 14th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference,
Sponsored by the International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., November 8, 2013
“The prospect of a government bailout reduces market discipline, giving creditors, investors, and coun-
terparties less incentive to monitor vigilantly those institutions that they perceive will not be allowed to
fail.”
SIGTARP, Statement of Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector General, Troubled Asset Relief Program,
March 30, 2010
1 Introduction
To address the financial system turmoil and resulting economic recession during the
Global Financial Crisis, the U.S. government, Federal Reserve, and other regulatory agen-
cies took some of the most aggressive policies in the history of banking. There were nu-
merous bank bailouts, including the prominent Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).
More than a decade later – now in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis that has resulted
in nonfinancial sector bailouts and may yet involve bank bailouts – the topic of bank
bailouts still spurs significant controversy and debate.
A key unresolved policy issue concerns whether bailed-out banks may be subject to
either significantly weakened versus strengthened market discipline by depositors and
other creditors, shareholders, and other counterparties. Market participants may face
reduced incentives to monitor bank risks and take actions to address these risks due to the
perceived safety generated by the bailouts and/or increased expectations of future bailouts
(e.g., Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter 2011; Balasubramnian and Cyree 2011;
Acharya and Mora 2015; Hett and Schmidt 2017). If market discipline does decrease, this
may in turn fuel higher bank risk-taking and increase the likelihood of future financial
crises. In sharp contrast, others claim to the contrary that bailouts may increase market
discipline on the bailed-out institutions. This is because bailouts may stigmatize the
recipients, creating doubt about their financial health, and result in market participants
exerting more discipline on these banks (e.g., Philippon and Skreta 2012; Tirole 2012;
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Armantier, Ghysels, Sarkar, and Shrader 2015; Ennis 2019; Che, Choe, and Rhee 2020).
Excessive market discipline may also have unfavorable social consequences in terms of
substantially reduced confidence in the financial system and curtailments in the supply
of credit that may hamper economic recovery. Put in the vernacular, bailouts may either
put market participants to sleep or wake them up to bank risks, with both extremes
posing significant financial and economic hazards.
To break the tension between these opposing views, we investigate the effects of
bailouts on market discipline by depositors using the TARP bailout as a quasi-natural
experiment. During 2008:Q4-2009:Q4, the U.S. Department of the Treasury infused pre-
ferred equity capital into over 700 different banking organizations, including bank holding
companies (BHCs), commercial banks, S&Ls, and thrifts. The bailout had several main
objectives, including, but not limited to, increasing the stability of the U.S. financial
system and improving real economic conditions. Any effects on market discipline would
be mostly unintended consequences.
Market discipline is crucially important to the stability of the banking sector, helping
to offset bank moral hazard incentives and improve efficiency (see, e.g., Flannery 1998;
Flannery and Nikolova 2004; Flannery and Bliss 2019). Market discipline requires that
private-sector agents both incur costs that are increasing in bank risks and act on the basis
of these costs by charging banks higher interest rates or other prices, or by withdrawing
business opportunities to them (Berger 1991). Moral hazard incentives are particularly
strong in banking due to government-backed deposit insurance and other safety net pro-
tections in addition to bailouts, making market discipline all the more vital for banks.
The international Basel Accords that apply to the U.S. establish market discipline as
one of the key pillars for effective bank supervision and regulation, complementing the
supervisory and capital elements (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2005; Marsh
and Roman 2018).
We address the market discipline issue by conducting the first empirical investigation
of the effects of TARP on market discipline by depositors, the majority debtholders of the
banks. Specifically, we analyze how TARP influenced both deposit quantities and prices
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of TARP recipients relative to other banks, controlling for other factors in a difference-
in-differences (DID) setting. Deposit growth rates are taken from Call Reports, and
implicit deposit rate premiums are derived from both Call Report and RateWatch survey
data. We regress measures of deposit growth rates and interest rate premiums on a
TARP recipient dummy interacted with a time indicator for the post-TARP program
implementation (the DID term). We also include a strong set of controls for bank and
market characteristics, as well as bank and time fixed effects. We conduct our tests on
all bank deposits, as well as on a number of subsets of the data.
To identify the effects of bailouts on depositor discipline – supply effects – we use both
quantities and prices to distinguish net demand effects from net supply effects, since a
change in quantities or prices alone could be explained by either supply or demand. There
are a number of reasons why bailouts might shift the recipient banks’ demand for deposits.
TARP banks’ demand for deposits may shift down because of the increased funding from
the Treasury’s preferred equity capital injections, choices to increase common equity
funding, or reductions in asset portfolios. Conversely, TARP banks might increase deposit
demand because of choices to reduce common equity, repay TARP funds early, or increase
asset portfolios. Finally, TARP banks’ demand for any particular deposit category may
decrease or increase due to a desired shift among liability categories.
As will become clear, our treatment of both demand and supply effects from TARP
differs quite sharply from both the extant market discipline literature in banking and the
extensive literature on the effects of TARP. The market discipline literature generally
focuses on the supply of funds from market participants only, and the TARP literature
usually concentrates on demands and supplies of the recipient banks, as opposed their
customers’ reactions.
Our main empirical findings are quite surprising. Instead of finding that market
discipline by depositors significantly declined or increased from the TARP bailouts, we
find any such change in depositor discipline is dwarfed by decreases in deposit demand
by TARP banks. As illustrated by the second line of the title of our paper, “depositors
need not apply and need not run.” That is, they need not reduce or increase discipline,
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given that the TARP banks are actively shunning deposits so strongly. We find that
both deposit quantities and rates decrease with bailouts, consistent with a substantial
downward shift in deposit demand, rather than any significant changes in deposit supply
from depositor discipline.
Our main results are robust to a number of different checks and alternative specifica-
tions. We provide evidence that our results are not driven by reverse causality concerns
using an instrumental variable (IV) approach, which relies on banks’ geography-based
political connections as instrumental variables for TARP injections. We also provide
several articles of evidence that our results are attributable to the treatment effect of
government capital injection rather than selection of TARP banks into the program. In
all specifications, we additionally explicitly control for proxies of bank financial health
similar to the TARP program selection criteria. We account as well for any time-invariant
heterogeneity between TARP and non-TARP recipients using bank fixed effects. We show
that our findings hold up to a matched sample analysis, falsification tests, and alternative
definitions of the key variables.
While our main findings are strong and robust, some of the results from the examina-
tion of subsets of the data provide some important exceptions. The data for uninsured
deposits, transaction deposits, and deposits held by banks that repaid TARP early sug-
gest that deposits in these categories temporarily increased in response to TARP in some
cases, contrary to our main findings. These exceptions do not allow for strong conclu-
sions, but they are consistent with weakened depositor discipline in these cases. Thus,
while our overall conclusion about reduced deposit demand by banks dominates changes
in depositor discipline remains unchanged, the subset analyses suggest that for some
depositors, depositor discipline was more likely weakened than strengthened.
We make several contributions to the literature. First, this paper contributes to the
bank bailout literature by investigating the important concern whether market discipline
is increased or decreased by these bailouts. To our knowledge, we are the first to examine
the effect of TARP bailouts on depositor discipline. Forssbaeck and Nielsen (2016) is the
only other related paper we know that has looked at market discipline effects of bailouts
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by subordinated debtholders. Second, we contribute to the market discipline literature
by incorporating both quantities and prices to distinguish between supply and demand
effects. Our findings also have policy implications for debates on costs and benefits of
bailouts.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our contributions to
the literature, and Section 3 describes our hypotheses. Section 4 gives the methodology
we employ. Section 5 describes the data, identification strategy, model specification, and
variable construction. Section 6 presents our main results and robustness tests, while
Section 7 describes extensions and additional robustness tests. Section 8 concludes.
2 Contributions to the Literature
Our paper contributes to two distinct literatures: market discipline and bank bailouts.
2.1 Market Discipline
There is a large empirical literature on bank market discipline focused mainly on two
major groups of bank stakeholders that may exert discipline: subordinated debtholders
and depositors.1 Starting with the former, subordinated debtholders lose their invest-
ments if the bank defaults and have no additional gains if the bank takes more risk and
succeeds, and so are motivated to control default risks. Research focuses on whether
subordinated debtholders can recognize bank risks, monitor and influence banks, and
provide effective market discipline. Many papers find evidence of market discipline from
subordinated debtholders, documenting that subordinated debt yields and premiums are
correlated with accounting measures of bank risk, asset portfolio composition, credit
agency ratings, regulatory ratings, and likelihood of undercapitalization or failure (e.g.,
Flannery and Sorescu 1996; Jagtiani, Kaufman, and Lemieux 1999, 2002; Hancock and
Kwast 2001; Jagtiani and Lemieux 2001; Morgan and Stiroh 2001; Bliss and Flannery
1Flannery (1998) and Flannery (2010), Bliss (2014), and Flannery and Bliss (2019) provide surveys of the
market discipline literature. Other bank stakeholders that could also exercise discipline are shareholders
and bank loan and off-balance sheet customers, but the literatures on these stakeholders are relatively
thin.
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2002; Blum 2002; Evanoff and Wall 2002; Sironi 2003; Flannery and Nikolova 2004;
Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson 2005; Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes 2006; Pop 2006;
Evanoff, Jagtiani, and Nakata 2011; Danisewicz, McGowan, Onali, and Schaeck 2018,
2020). Some papers find that safety net policies can weaken market discipline for banks
(e.g., Balasubramnian and Cyree 2011; Acharya, Anginer, and Warburton 2016). Turn-
ing to depositors, uninsured depositors have the most to lose from bank default and so
have the strongest incentives to monitor bank activities and discipline riskier banks by
withdrawing funds or demanding higher interest rates (see, e.g. Chen, Goldstein, Huang,
and Vashishtha 2020). Research finds that depositors react to an increase in the risk of
their banks measured by leverage, variability of earnings, asset risk, and expected prob-
ability of default (e.g., Hannan and Hanweck 1988; Ellis and Flannery 1992; Goldberg
and Hudgins 1996, 2002; Billett, Garfinkel, and O’Neal 1998; Park and Peristiani 1998;
Maechler and McDill 2006; Iyer and Puri 2012; Iyer, Puri, and Ryan 2016), but finds
little or no discipline from depositors on bank managers (see, e.g., Jordan, Peek, and
Rosengren 1999; Gilbert and Vaughan 2001; Jagtiani and Lemieux 2001). Depending on
the development and the institutions of the studied banking market, the introduction of
explicit deposit insurance is found to either weaken depositor discipline (e.g., Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga 2004; Karas, Pyle, and Schoors 2013; Ioannidou and Dreu 2019) or
not weaken this discipline (e.g., Martinez Peria and Schmukler 2001).
There is also some research about the effects of depositor discipline during and around
financial crises, when most of the bank bailouts occur. Some papers find an increase
in depositor discipline during crises consistent with “wake-up” effects on depositors to
bank risks. Opiela (2004) finds that in the period preceding the 1997 crisis in Thailand,
depositors increased their market discipline by monitoring banks and finance companies
more closely. Karas, Pyle, and Schoors (2010) investigate discipline by Russian depositors
around the Russian crisis of 1998, when bailouts were not available for the large majority
of banks. They find both firm and household depositors reacted to the crisis by exerting
more discipline. Bennett, Hwa, and Kwast (2015) evaluate the FDIC’s expectations
about losses to creditors at banks that failed during the Global Financial Crisis and find
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evidence of market discipline from uninsured depositors, insured depositors, and general
creditors far enough in advance to signal to both banks and supervisors that corrective
actions can and should be taken. They also find that these market participants are
able to distinguish among banks of different risks. Similarly, Lamers (2015) investigates
discipline by depositors in local U.S. banking markets around the time of bank failures
during the Global Financial Crisis and finds that a wake-up call materializes in those
markets where a bank failed. Finally, Acharya and Mora (2012, 2015) examine deposit
flows and rates through the first part of 2009. They report that riskier banks about to
fail during the crisis experienced large deposit outflows and raised deposit rates to attract
new deposits but were only weakly successful.
Others find that depositors exhibit either reduced market discipline and/or low sen-
sitivity to bank fundamentals during crises, consistent with “go to sleep” effects. Berger
and Turk-Ariss (2015) investigate depositor discipline in the U.S. and EU countries before
and during the Global Financial Crisis, which involved many bank bailouts. They find
significant depositor discipline prior to the crisis in both the U.S. and EU, but this disci-
pline mostly decreased during the crisis, with the notable exception of small U.S. banks.
Levy-Yeyati, Martinez Peria, and Schmukler (2004) look at depositors’ reactions during
the crisis periods in Argentina and Uruguay and find that depositors become more sensi-
tive to macroeconomic risks but less sensitive to bank-specific factors. Oliveira, Schiozer,
and Barros (2015) look at effects on depositors in Brazil during the global turmoil of
2008 and find evidence of depositor run from smaller banks toward systemically impor-
tant banks, which is better explained by the perception of a too-big-to-fail policy rather
than bank fundamentals. Finally, Hasan, Jackowicz, Kowalewski, and Kozłowski (2013)
use data from several Central European countries and find that the recent crisis did
not seem to change the sensitivity of deposit growth rates to accounting risk measures.
Depositors’ actions were more strongly influenced by negative press rumors concerning
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parent companies than by fundamentals.2,3
Our research differs from these papers in that we focus specifically on differences
between banks that are bailed out and those that are not, rather than the general effects
of financial crises, which include bailouts and many other factors.
2.2 Bank Bailouts
In the interest of brevity, we only review the findings for TARP, the most studied of
all bailouts. As noted, Forssbaeck and Nielsen (2016) is the only paper of which we know
that analyzes disciplinary effects on TARP bailouts, and they focus on subordinated
debtholders, rather than depositors. They use a sample of 123 BHCs over the period
of 2004-2013 and find that predicted distress risk from TARP has consistently positive
and significant effects on subordinated debt spreads, suggesting an increase in market
discipline. However, their results are transitory and disappear altogether if the largest
banks are dropped from the sample. Our study differs significantly in that we study
deposits rather than subordinated debt and in that we include quantities and prices to
disentangle demand and supply effects.
There is a very large literature on the consequences of TARP bailouts, and we focus
here just on the studies of bank risk-taking effects of these bailouts. Starting with credit
risk, Duchin and Sosyura (2014) use a sample of publicly traded financial firms, which
tend to be the largest firms, and find that TARP banks approve riskier loans. Berger,
Makaew, and Roman (2019) use corporate credits, which are mostly also issued by large
banks, and find that TARP generally led to more improvements in the terms of credit
for high-risk borrowers. Similarly, Berger and Roman (2017) find that TARP banks shift
into commercial real estate lending, which tends to be very risky. Also consistent with
risk shifting, Agarwal and Zhang (2018) and Chavaz and Rose (2019) find more future
2Also related to crises but not focused on depositors, Hett and Schmidt (2017) use a novel test for market
discipline based on changes in debt-to-equity sensitivity for a sample of large financial firms (including
banks, insurance companies, and GSEs) to infer market participants’ bailout expectations and their
discipline during the Global Financial Crisis. They find that market discipline deteriorated over the
crisis period, but this trend reversed after the initiation of the Dodd-Frank Act.
3Related to booms rather than crises, Lin (2020) finds a reduction in deposits growth when the stock
market is booming due to reduced household demand for retail deposits during such times. This deposit
decline further induces a contraction in bank lending and real activity of bank-dependent firms.
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problem loans for TARP banks. Black and Hazelwood (2013) find higher credit risk for
large banks and lower credit risk for small banks.4
Despite the common finding of increased credit risk, several studies find that TARP
banks increased their capital ratios and so they reduced their leverage risks. To be
clear, these are studies of common equity and leverage based on common equity and
do not include preferred equity, which increased mechanically due to the injections by
the U.S. Treasury under TARP. Duchin and Sosyura (2014), Calabrese, Degl’Innocenti,
and Osmetti (2017) and Berger, Roman, and Sedunov (2020) all find that accounting-
based common equity-to-assets ratios increased, decreasing accounting leverage risk un-
der TARP, and also find consistent results for market-based capital ratios and leverage.
Berger, Roman, and Sedunov (2020) also document that the systemic risk contributions
of TARP banks are reduced relative to those of non-TARP banks, almost entirely due to
the decrease in market leverage.
We add to the TARP and other bailout research literatures by focusing on the effects
of this bailout on market discipline by depositors, which is heretofore unstudied.
3 Hypothesis Development
We are concerned with whether TARP bailouts increased or decreased market disci-
pline supply effects from depositors, while recognizing that deposit quantities and prices
are also determined by bank demands that may also be influenced by TARP. Since TARP
may have increased or decreased both deposit supplies and demands, we formulate and
test four empirical hypotheses that map the four combinations of changes in quantity and
price changes.
There are two cases of relative quantity and price changes that map into the empirical
domination of supply-side hypotheses in which we can determine if market discipline by
depositors decreased or increased:
4Many studies also examine the effects of TARP on the quantities of credit supplied, mostly finding positive
effects, also consistent with increased credit risk see Berger and Roman (2020) for a comprehensive survey.
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• Hypothesis 1 (“Decreased Discipline” or “Depositors Need Not Run” Hy-
pothesis): Depositors move more deposits toward TARP recipients, as these are
now considered safer because of the bailout or because of an increased expected
probability of future bailouts (Quantity ↑ Price ↓).
• Hypothesis 2 (“Increased Discipline” or “Depositors Run” Hypothesis): De-
positors reduce supplies to TARP recipients relative to other banks because these
banks are perceived as riskier or are stigmatized by the bailouts (Quantity ↓ Price
↑).
There are also two cases that map quantity and price changes into the empirical
domination of demand-side hypotheses in which we can determine if bank demand for
deposits from TARP banks decreased or increased:
• Hypothesis 3 (“More Deposits Needed” Hypothesis): Banks increase their
demand for deposits to replace other funding sources and/or to increase assets
(Quantity ↑ Price ↑).
• Hypothesis 4 (“Depositors Need Not Apply” Hypothesis): Banks reduce their
demand for deposits because of additional funds from other sources and/or decreases
in asset portfolios (Quantity ↓ Price ↓).
None of these four hypotheses rules out the others. Our empirical analysis simply
determines which one is empirically dominant. This may differ across deposit types. For
example, market discipline effects may be stronger for uninsured deposits, since these
depositors have more of their own funds at risk, so Hypotheses 1 or 2 may be more
likely to dominate for uninsured deposits.
4 Methodology
4.1 Baseline Empirical Framework
Our approach of identifying changes in supply and demand for deposits by examining
changes in deposit quantities and prices is in line with the existing literature (e.g., Park
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and Peristiani 1998; Martinez Peria and Schmukler 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga
2004; Karas, Pyle, and Schoors 2013; Berger and Turk-Ariss 2015; Ioannidou and Dreu
2019). We estimate two reduced form equations for the net flow of deposits and the
deposit rate premium charged by the bank. The baseline specifications are:
∆ lnDit = β0 + β1POSTt × TARPi + β2CONTROLSit−1 + µi + νt + εit (1a)
rit − rft = b0 + b1POSTt × TARPi + b2CONTROLSit−1 +mi + nt + eit, (1b)
where ∆ lnDit represents the quarterly deposit growth rate calculated in log differ-
ences for bank i at time t, and rit − rft is the deposit rate the bank pays in excess of
a risk-free rate. Our main variable of interest is the difference-in-differences interaction
term POSTt × TARPi, where POSTt is a dummy taking on the value 1 after the start
of the TARP program and 0 otherwise, and TARPi is a dummy taking on the value 1
if the bank received TARP funds and 0 otherwise. The specifications include individual
bank and local market control variables to account for bank-specific and market-specific
conditions that otherwise might impact the demand and supply for deposits, as well as
bank fixed effects (µi and mi) and time fixed effects (νt and nt) to control for remaining
unobserved heterogeneity. The variables POSTt and TARPi do not appear independently
in the equation because they are absorbed by the time and bank fixed effects, respectively.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
Our coefficients of interest are β1 and b1, which tell us how deposit flows and rates
changed for banks after they received the TARP capital injections relative to non-TARP
banks, ceteris paribus. A positive β1 would indicate that TARP banks see higher inflows
or lower outflows of deposits after receiving TARP compared to other banks. Similarly,
a positive b1 would suggest that TARP banks pay higher rates on their deposits after re-
ceiving TARP relative to non-recipients. Of course, negative values would have opposing
implications. To disentangle supply shocks from demand shocks and see which hypothesis
is supported, we jointly inspect β1 and b1. A finding of β1 < 0 and b1 > 0 would sup-
port the empirical dominance of increased discipline under Hypothesis 2 (“Depositors
11
Run”). Alternatively, β1 > 0 and b1 < 0 would be in line with empirical dominance of
Hypothesis 1 (“Depositors Need Not Run”), β1 > 0 and b1 > 0 with Hypothesis 3
(“More Deposits Needed”), and β1 < 0 and b1 < 0 with Hypothesis 4 (“Depositors
Need Not Apply”).
4.2 Further Endogeneity and Sample Selection Approaches
We estimate our specifications using OLS and instrumental variables (IV). The OLS
specifications treat the TARP funds as if they were exogenously determined. However,
TARP banks and non-TARP banks may differ from one another in systematic ways.
The first eight involuntary participants were very large banks, and others had to apply
for the funding. These funds were supposed to be allocated to banks deemed healthy
enough by regulators. In reality, there are many potential reverse causality and omitted
variable concerns raised in the TARP literature that may create bias in the OLS coeffi-
cients and require IV. We follow this literature and instrument TARP capital injections
with two political variables – whether the local congressional district representative of
the bank’s headquarters served on the Financial Institutions Subcommittee or Capital
Markets Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee in 2008 or 2009 and
whether she/he is a Democrat (e.g., Duchin and Sosyura 2012, 2014; Li 2013; Berger and
Roman 2015, 2017). Prior research (e.g., Duchin and Sosyura 2012) shows that these
subcommittees played a direct role in the development of the Emergency Economic Sta-
bilization Act (EESA), which created TARP and prepared voting recommendations for
Congress on the bill, arranged meetings between banks and the Treasury, wrote letters to
regulators, and inserted provisions into EESA to help particular firms. In addition, po-
litical ideology also affected a representative’s action, i.e., Republicans tended to oppose
bank government bailouts more categorically than Democrats (e.g., Li 2013). However,
representatives and their subcommittees memberships were determined in advance of
TARP by the House leadership and are largely exogenous to the individual banks.
Because the TARP variable is binary, we follow the dummy endogenous variable
model in Wooldridge (2002) procedure 18.4.1 (pp. 236-237), which involves a three-step
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approach and was used in prior TARP literature.5
In line with most of the literature, we apply a homogeneous treatment in which POST
equals 1 starting from 2009:Q1 onward, and 0 otherwise. We also test whether our results
are robust to our choice of the treatment period by rerunning the baseline regressions
using the actual dates for each bank.
To further alleviate selection concerns, we also consider a matched sample analy-
sis. We apply Mahalanobis Distance Matching on bank-level CAMELS components and
market-level control variables in 2007:Q4 (at least one year before the capital injections
start) to match TARP banks with non-TARP banks. We rerun our results on the matched
sample.
Finally, we execute a falsification test for our baseline results, in which we randomly
assign TARP to the banks, keeping the proportions of TARP and non-TARP banks equal
to the sample proportions. We repeat this random assignment 1,000 times and rerun the
baseline OLS regressions to arrive at a distribution of coefficients we can use for statistical
inference.
5 Data
5.1 Data and Sample Selection
To address our research question, we require data on deposit holdings and deposit
interest rates of both TARP and non-TARP banks, risk-free rates to compute the rate
premiums, information on which banks received TARP capital injections, and other data
on the banks and their local markets to construct the control variables. We collect our
data from multiple sources.
Our main source of bank data are the quarterly Reports of Condition and Income (Call
Reports). From these reports, we obtain quarterly frequency balance sheet information
and income statement data between 2004:Q1 and 2012:Q4 for unconsolidated commercial
5We first run a probit explaining TARP distribution using political connection variables as well as bank-
level and market-level control variables, and in the next stage, we instrument receiving TARP with the
probability from the first stage probit regression. A similar approach is recommended in Angrist and
Pischke (2009).
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banks. Since TARP capital was injected at the bank holding company (BHC) level of
affiliated banks, we consolidate the Call Report data of all the banks in each BHC. If the
commercial bank is independent, however, we keep the data for the commercial bank.
For expositional ease, we henceforth use the term “banks” to indicate either entity. We
exclude entities that do not refer to commercial banks (RSSD9331 = 1), have missing
or incomplete financial data for key financial variables such as total assets or equity, or
that failed before 2009:Q1 (i.e., before the observation of TARP effects). Following prior
research, to avoid distortions for the Equity to GTA ratio, for all observations with equity
less than 0.01 times gross total assets (GTA), we replace Equity with 1 percent of GTA.6
The bank financial variables are deflated to 2012:Q4 dollars using the seasonally ad-
justed GDP deflator, and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.7 As one of our
dependent variables is the percentage change in deposits, we also account for mergers by
removing the bank-quarter observation when the merger took place. The merger infor-
mation comes from the bank M&A lists of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Our
final sample is an unbalanced panel comprising 219,206 bank-quarter observations for
8,059 individual banks covering the period 2004:Q1 to 2012:Q4.
5.2 Deposit Variables
For every bank for every quarter, we collect the stock of total deposits, as well as
insured deposits and uninsured deposits. Total deposits can be directly obtained from
the Call Reports. To calculate uninsured deposits, we use Call Report Schedule RC-O
and take all the funds in accounts that are partially insured and subtract the amount
that is insured, while carefully considering separate treatment for several time periods
affected by changes in deposit insurance limits over our sample period.
Specifically, for the period 2004:Q1-2006:Q1, we calculate the uninsured deposits as
6Gross total assets (GTA) equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated
transfer risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). Total assets on Call Reports deduct these two
reserves, which are held to cover potential credit losses. We add these reserves back to measure the full
value of the assets financed.
7To further deal with extreme values in growth rates and ensure that they are not impacting our results,
we also conducted additional tests in which we winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles as well as at
the 10th and 90th percentiles. Our main findings continue to hold.
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the amount of bank deposit accounts (demand, savings, and time) with a balance on the
report date of more than $100K minus the number of such deposit accounts multiplied by
$100K. For the period 2006:Q2-2009:Q2, we take into account the different treatment of
deposit retirement accounts versus the rest. Thus, we calculate the uninsured deposits as
the amount of bank deposit accounts (demand, savings, and time, excluding retirement
accounts) with a balance on the report date of more than $100K, minus the number of
such deposit accounts multiplied by $100K, plus the amount of bank deposit retirement
accounts with a balance on the report date of more than $250K, minus the number of
such deposit accounts multiplied by $250K.
For the period 2009:Q3 onward, we account for the deposit insurance limit increase
from $100K to $250K for all deposits except foreign ones. Thus, we calculate the unin-
sured deposits as the amount of bank deposit accounts (demand, savings, and time,
including retirement accounts) with a balance on the report date of more than $250,000
minus the number of such deposit accounts multiplied by $250,000. While the last change
in deposit insurance took place in October 2008, the Call Report did not change to reflect
this increase in limit until 2009:Q3.8 We further subtract from the uninsured deposits
the deposits that fell under the FDIC Transaction Account Guarantee Program (TAGP)
during the Global Financial Crisis over October 14, 2008, to December 31, 2010, and fur-
ther extended to December 31, 2012, by the Dodd-Frank Act, providing unlimited deposit
insurance for non-interest-bearing transaction accounts. Finally, for all time periods, we
also add the foreign deposits to the uninsured deposits because foreign deposits are not
covered by FDIC deposit insurance.
The deposit rates are derived from multiple sources. We construct the implicit in-
terest rate using Call Report data as interest expense minus service charges divided by
the amount of total deposits. We also employ data from RateWatch, a weekly survey
collecting rates on a number of standardized deposit products. Since RateWatch data
8If all banks are affected equally by this increase in deposit insurance limit, including time fixed effects
would be sufficient to correct for this issue. However, Lambert, Noth, and Schüwer (2017) show that this
was not the case. In robustness analyses, we have excluded 2009:Q3 and the results are robust to the
exclusion of this quarter. Since deposit flows are obtained from the deposit stocks, this issue disappears
after this quarter.
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are collected at bank-branch level, we first link the RateWatch data to the Summary
of Deposits database using the unique branch identifier, uninumbr. We then select the
last-recorded rate for each bank in each quarter as the deposit rate. For banks on which
we have data from multiple branches, we aggregate the deposit rates up to the bank-level
using the deposit share from the FDIC Summary of Deposits.
We select deposit rates with the highest availability throughout the sample. Following
Ben-David, Palvia, and Spatt (2017), Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2017), and Lin
(2020), we select two products from the RateWatch data, namely the CD rate for accounts
of $10K with a maturity of 12 months, as well as the CD rate for accounts of $100K with a
maturity of 12 months. The $10K CDs cover 77 percent of our bank-quarter observations
and the $10K CDs cover 38 percent. The implicit interest rate, as well as the two CD
rates are taken in excess of a risk-free rate, for which we use the 1-Year Treasury Constant
Maturity Rate.
5.3 Bailout Variables and Instruments
We collect information on the TARP bailouts under the Capital Purchase Program
(CPP) from the U.S. Treasury website.9 We acquire the bank name, exact date of pur-
chase, amount of purchase, repayment dates, and information on whether the bank has
missed divided payments. In total, we have data on injections in 709 unique institutions,
572 of which are bank holding companies and 87 are commercial banks, while the rest
are S&Ls and thrifts. We match by name and location the institutions in the U.S. Trea-
sury list with their corresponding RSSD9001 (Call Report ID) where available using the
National Information Center database. We exclude S&Ls and thrifts because their data
is not comparable with banks, and their business models are different. The majority of
TARP injections were repaid by 2011, although 297 banks had not fully repaid TARP at
the end of our sample period in 2012:Q4.
To instrument TARP with political connections, we collect data from the Center for
Responsive Politics and House of Representatives websites information on whether banks
9http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/Pages/default.aspx
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are headquartered in a congressional district of a House member who served on the
Capital Markets Subcommittee or the Financial Institutions Subcommittee of the House
Financial Services Committee in 2008 or 2009. We also obtain information on whether the
bank was headquartered in a district where the local representative was a Democrat in the
2007/2008 campaign election cycle. Finally, we use the MABLE/Geocorr2k software on
the Missouri Census Data Center website to associate banks with congressional districts
by using the zip codes of their headquarters.
5.4 Bank and Market Control Variables
We employ several bank and local economic variables as controls. We include proxies
for the regulatory CAMELS ratings components that were used in the TARP approval
process and proxy for the bank financial health and riskiness.10 These are important to
include because banks in a more precarious condition and riskier (lower levels of capital,
asset quality, management quality, earnings, liquidity, and having a higher sensitivity to
market risks) are expected to pay higher interest rates on their deposits or see a lower
inflow of deposits. We follow standard definitions in the literature and proxy Capital
Adequacy (C) by the simple (unweighted) equity ratio, Asset Quality (A) is proxied by
the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans, Management Quality (M) is measured
by the cost-to-income ratio, Earnings (E) are proxied by the return-on-assets, Liquidity
(L) is proxied by the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, and Sensitivity to Market Risk
(S) is measured by the absolute gap between short-term assets and short-term liabilities
divided by GTA. However, we recognize that our CAMELS proxies may be imperfect
measures of the true regulatory CAMELS scores because they do not capture the content
of onsite examinations or other intangible characteristics. Other bank controls include
bank size, measured by the natural logarithm of GTA, the age of the oldest bank in the
organization, and whether the bank is a BHC.
10CAMELS is a confidential supervisory rating system used by U.S. regulatory authorities to rate the
financial condition of banks, according to the six factors represented by its acronym: Capital Adequacy,
Asset Quality, Management Quality, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to Market Risk. The ratings
in each category, ranging from 1 (best) to 5 (worst), are assigned based on financial ratios and onsite
examinations.
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We also control for local economic conditions to which the banks are exposed as banks
present in low poverty areas, high median household income areas, or high gross regional
domestic product per capita areas may see a higher inflow of deposits. We collect county-
level data on the poverty rate, median household income, and the gross regional domestic
product (GDP) per capita from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA), and aggregate this information to the bank level by using deposit shares
in the bank’s markets of operation from the FDIC Summary of Deposits.
Finally, we proxy for the local bank concentration with the county-level Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) of bank deposits using again data from the FDIC Summary
of Deposits and aggregate the index to the bank level using the deposit shares of the
affiliated branches.
5.5 Summary Statistics for Key Variables
Table 1 shows summary statistics for our key variables in the final dataset. Of the
8,059 unique banks between 2004:Q1 and 2012:Q4, 646 banks received TARP, accounting
for 9 percent of the bank-quarter observations.11 At the time of the capital injections,
the bailout size was equivalent to 2.5 percent of the risk-weighted assets and 22 percent
of risk-based capital.
Regarding the key endogenous variables, growth in deposits and deposit rate premia,
banks’ total deposits grew on average 1.53 percent per quarter and insured and uninsured
deposits grew by 1.35 percent and 2.48 percent, respectively. However, large variations
can be seen in the data. The excess implied interest rate is always negative. This
may reflect the fact that the implied interest rate excludes the value to depositors of
transaction services, safekeeping, and other services implicitly included in the deposit
contract. The excess interest rates from RateWatch on the $10K and $100K CDs are on
average positive, with the $10K CD having an excess rate of 0.17 percent on average and
the $100K CD having an excess rate of 0.50 percent on average. However, the sample
size for the latter rate decreases considerably due to the scarce availability of these rates
11This excludes S&Ls and thrifts as well as a few other TARP institutions in the official list with missing
financial data and/or due to other data restrictions mentioned above.
18
in the RateWatch survey.
As for control variables, Table 1 shows that banks in our sample were in good health. 
Banks appeared to be well capitalized as the simple equity rate equals 11.4 percent, and 
only an average of 1.75 percent of their loan portfolios was nonperforming.
5.6 Parallel Trends Analysis
Figure 1 plots the evolution over time of the simple average, unconditional deposit 
flows and deposit rates we use in our baseline analysis for TARP and non-TARP banks. 
The deposit flows exhibit seasonality, with s lightly lower quarter-on-quarter flows of  de-
posits in each second quarter compared to higher flows i n t he f ourth q uarter. Such 
seasonality is accounted for in the regression models with the time fixed effects.
Figure 1, Panel A shows that before TARP implementation, TARP banks 
experienced average higher inflows of deposits than non-TARP banks, but this reverses 
after program initiation. Figure 1, Panel B shows the same pattern for the insured 
deposits, but it is less apparent for uninsured deposits in Figure 1, Panel C. A potential 
concern is that riskier TARP banks may have scrambled for liquidity and attracted more 
deposits before TARP (e.g., Acharya and Mora 2012), but not after TARP. However, 
our results hold when we conduct a Mahalanobis Distance Matching in which we 
match TARP banks with other non-TARP banks on bank and market controls 
including several bank risk indicators in 2007:Q4, alleviating such concerns.
Turning to interest rates in Figure 1, Panels D-F, the deposit rates on the 12-
Month 10K CDs and 12-Month 100K CDs from RateWatch suggest that TARP banks 
pay lower interest rates on their deposits compared to non-TARP banks after 
initiation. The im-plicit interest rate from the Call Reports shows that the gap 
between rates of TARP banks and non-TARP banks has become smaller in the TARP 
period.
The aggregate movements of both lower quantities and lower prices for TARP banks 
relative to non-TARP banks after TARP was initiated provide some preliminary evidence 
consistent with the empirical domination of a negative demand shift for deposits under 
Hypothesis 4 above. The figures also suggest that the parallel trends assumptions are
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not violated for either deposit flows or the deposit rates.
Of course, these aggregate trends are only mildly suggestive, and neither show indi-
vidual bank behavior nor include control variables. In the next section, we investigate our
question more rigorously in our DID model, controlling for different demand and supply
factors and addressing potential endogeneity concerns.
6 Empirical Results
6.1 Main Results
We start with our baseline findings from estimating Equations 1a and 1b with OLS.
Table 2 shows regressions of the inflow of total deposits – as well as insured and uninsured
deposits – and the different measures of the deposit rate on the DID term POSTt×TARPi.
All regressions include bank and time fixed effects as well as time-varying bank-level
controls described in Section 4, and standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
Our first result in column (1) is that total deposits decline significantly for TARP
banks after they receive preferred equity injections compared to non-TARP banks. In
the POST period, TARP banks have average lower inflows of 0.589 percent per quarter.
These results are economically large, as the average inflow of deposits is 1.175 percent
per quarter in the post-TARP period. The decrease in deposits is mainly driven by a
decrease in insured rather than uninsured deposits.
Turning to deposit rates in columns (4)-(6), we see that all DID terms have negative
signs and are statistically significant. The pricing result is also economically sizable.
TARP banks have a lower implicit deposit rate premium of 7.5 basis points in the post-
TARP period, compared to an average implicit deposit rate premium of 6.2 basis points
in the post-TARP period. The negative findings for both quantities and prices together
support Hypothesis 4, “Depositors Need Not Apply,” suggesting reduced demand
for deposits by TARP banks relative to non-TARP banks.
The results for the controls suggest that banks with higher capital ratios, banks with
better asset quality, smaller banks, and banks with branches in more affluent markets
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see higher inflows of insured and uninsured deposits. For deposit rates, the signs on
the control variables are less consistent in magnitude and in sign, consistent with the
mixed findings in the literature (e.g., Maechler and McDill 2006; Acharya and Mora
2015; Bennett, Hwa, and Kwast 2015; Ben-David, Palvia, and Spatt 2017).
6.2 Selection and Endogeneity
Table 3 addresses the robustness of our results. In Panel A, we show the results of our
IV estimates using political variables to exogenize the bank level treatment with TARP.
In the first stage (Table A2 in the Appendix), the coefficients on the political variables
have positive signs and are statistically significant, in line with prior literature.12 The
second stage confirms our baseline results – the coefficients on the difference-in-differences
terms are negative, statistically significant and economically sizable for both deposit flows
and deposit prices, confirming our baseline OLS findings.13 Our baseline finding that the
effect is mainly driven by a reduction in the demand for insured deposits is confirmed.
The results are, in sum, fully in line with the baseline analysis and consistent with
Hypothesis 4, “Depositors Need Not Apply” that banks reduced their demand for
deposits.
In Panel B, we verify whether our results are robust to using the actual purchase dates
for each bank as the start of the TARP period rather than 2009:Q1. The coefficients are
quantitatively and qualitatively similar to our baseline analyses.
In Panel C, we report the results of our matched sample analysis. In Table A3 in the
Appendix, we show more information on the matching procedure and matching outcome.
The coefficients on the deposit quantities in our matched sample analysis are negative
and consistent with the baseline results. For the rates, we do see robustness of the result
on the implicit interest rate, but a bit less so on the RateWatch rates. Part of this
can be explained by the fact that not all matched banks have RateWatch survey rates
12Unreported first-stage F-tests also suggest that the instruments are valid.
13Since the IV approach estimates the local average treatment effect (LATE) of banks whose reception of
TARP funds is more likely determined by their political connections, the IV estimates are a factor of 4 
to 9 times larger in magnitude than the OLS estimates. Such an increase in magnitude of the LATE is 
consistent with the literature (e.g., Jiang, 2017).
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available in the pre-TARP period (especially for the 100K CD rate where the sample
drops from 82,158 to 15,871 observations), thereby considerably reducing the power of
the test for those variables in this setting. Still, our results remain broadly consistent
with the empirical dominance of Hypothesis 4, “Depositors Need Not Apply” and
do not support any of the other three hypotheses.
Finally, in Panel D, we show the results of our falsification experiment in which we
randomly assign the TARP treatment to banks 1,000 times in 2009:Q1, and reestimate
our main results for each repetition. We then report the mean DID coefficients together
with the corresponding 5th and 95th percentiles (shown in brackets). The confidence
band around the mean coefficient includes zero in all cases, indicating that the random
assignment of TARP has no significant effect on deposit flows or deposit rates, again
supporting our baseline findings.
6.3 Dynamics of the Effects
To examine the dynamics of our main effects over time, in Table 4, we split the POST
variable into four year-dummy variables that take on the value 1 for each year in the
treatment period. Panels A and B show OLS and IV findings, respectively.
The results for total deposits, insured deposits, and all deposit rates are generally
consistent with our baseline analyses, but the dynamics do show slight differences across
the years for the uninsured deposits. In 2009, TARP banks see an increase in the unin-
sured deposits compared to those banks that did not receive TARP, although this is offset
by negative flows in later years, rendering the uninsured deposits coefficient in our main
analysis above insignificant. Since we are not able to observe rates on uninsured deposits,
we are unfortunately unable to distinguish whether this might be because of a deposit
rate increase for uninsured deposits. However, the finding corresponds with previous lit-
erature stating that banks can offset losses of uninsured deposits with increased inflows
of insured deposits, and vice versa (see, e.g., Billett, Garfinkel, and O’Neal 1998; Martin,
Puri, and Ufier 2018).
One potential interpretation is that TARP banks see a decrease in depositor discipline
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for uninsured deposits in the first year of the TARP program, which then gives way to a
downward demand shift in later years. Thus, although we do not have separate pricing
results for uninsured deposits, we can say that the 2009 increase in the quantity of
uninsured deposits is at least consistent with a temporary decline in depositor discipline
by uninsured depositors and is not consistent with any increase in such discipline. That
is, it is more consistent with Hypothesis 1 than with Hypothesis 2 in the short run
for uninsured deposits.
6.4 Early Repayment
Following Berger and Roman (2015, 2017), we also test whether the results differ for
banks that repaid TARP early in 2009 or 2010 compared to those that did not. TARP
banks that repaid early were generally stronger institutions that were able to raise enough
capital to convince authorities that they were safe and were likely able to get rid of limits
on executive compensation. Table 5 splits TARP banks into those that repaid early
versus those that did not repay early, with Panels A and B showing OLS and IV results,
respectively.14
Our baseline results are only consistently found in the group of banks that did not
repay early. Banks that repaid early show some evidence of increased deposit quantities,
particularly for uninsured deposits, and mixed results for deposit rates. While we cannot
draw strong conclusions from this mixed evidence, the increases in deposit quantities for
the banks that repaid early are at least suggestive that there was more likely a decline
than an increase in depositor discipline for these banks. That is, the findings are more
consistent with Hypothesis 1 than with Hypothesis 2, since Hypothesis 2 would
require a decrease in deposits by these banks.
14Because we consider here the TARP recipients that did and did not repay early separately, following
prior research on TARP, we include one additional instrumental variable that accounts for the exit from
the TARP program: CEO Compensation $500K+. CEO Compensation $500K+ is a dummy that takes
a value of one if the bank’s CEO had a total compensation greater than $500,000 in 2008 because banks
with high CEO compensation are more likely to exit the program, following Wilson and Wu (2012) and
Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012). First stage results are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix.
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6.5 Unpacking the Results by Deposit Type
We next conduct a deeper analysis by deposit type, using Call Reports to obtain more
detailed data on the level of different deposit holdings of banks as well as their interest
rates. We follow Martin, Puri, and Ufier (2018) and distinguish non-demandable term
deposits (total, insured, and uninsured), non-maturity savings deposits, non-maturity
checking transaction deposits and non-core brokered deposits.15 In our sample, term
deposits make up 41.6 percent of total deposits (28.3 percent are insured and 13.3 percent
are uninsured), savings deposits make up 25.5 percent, and checking transaction deposits
make up 24.3 percent. Brokered deposits make up the remaining 8.6 percent, but we
exclude this category here because not all banks use brokered deposits. We also use the
Call Reports to construct implicit interest rates for each deposit category so that we can
investigate price movements.
We replicate the OLS results for the different categories in Table 6, Panel A and the
IV results in Panel B. Most categories show negative effects for both quantities and prices,
again consistent with baseline results favoring the empirical dominance ofHypothesis 4.
For transaction deposits, however, we find a positive significant coefficient for quantities,
along with a negative price coefficient that becomes significant in the IV estimation.
These findings support Hypothesis 1, a weakening of market discipline, for transaction
accounts.16
We cannot say with certainty whyHypothesis 4 dominates for all of the other deposit
categories and for deposits overall, but not for transaction deposits, but we postulate why
this might be true. Many transaction deposits are either non-interest-bearing or pay very
little explicit interest, so TARP banks that are otherwise reducing other deposit categories
by varying deposit rates are more limited in this ability for transaction deposits. Our
general finding of empirical dominance for Hypothesis 4 does not mean that the other
hypotheses are not functioning, but rather that the reduced demand for deposits by TARP
overwhelms them. Our finding of reduced depositor discipline for transaction accounts
15See Table A1 in the Appendix for more information on the variable definitions.
16The tests are also robust to using the exact TARP dates as treatment period and a falsification test where
we randomly assign TARP 1,000 times to banks in 2009:Q1, the other robustness checks in Table 3.
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may occur as well in the other categories but remains undetectable because TARP banks
are able to more effectively reduce their holdings of the other deposit types.
6.6 Channels Behind the Downward Shift in Deposit Demand
We next investigate some of the channels behind our main finding of the dominance of
Hypothesis 4, “Depositors Need Not Apply.” Specifically, we investigate whether
the reduced demand for deposits by TARP banks may have originated on the left- or
right-hand sides of their balance sheets. As discussed above, TARP banks may need fewer
deposits because they may shrink their assets or shift from deposits to other liabilities
or equity funding. In Table 7, we examine the effects of TARP on growth in these other
balance sheet entries, using the same control variables as in the earlier equations to gain
insights into which of these channels may be active. That is, we check whether assets
decline or other liabilities or equity increase with TARP, although we cannot claim cause
and effect from these variables to the deposit decline.
Panels A and B show the OLS and IV findings, respectively. In column (1), we
find evidence that TARP banks reduce their assets compared to non-TARP banks after
receiving the capital injection, and the results are statistically significant and hold for
both OLS and IV. These results are consistent with a channel in which TARP banks
reduce their demands for deposits relative to non-TARP banks because they want to
fund fewer assets. Column (2) shows a reduction in other liabilities and so does not
support a shift from deposits to other liabilities. Column (3) shows contradictory signs
for equity, and so does not support a switch from deposits to equity as fueling the decline
in deposits. Thus, the data are only consistent with the channel in which a desire for
fewer assets helps explain the reduced demand for deposits, but as indicated, we cannot
claim cause and effect from this channel analysis.
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7 Extensions and Additional Robustness Tests
In this section, we tie up several loose ends. We discuss additional robustness checks
for our main results, investigate the effects of TARP at the intensive margin, and conduct
cross-sectional tests based on bank characteristics. For brevity, we only replicate baseline
DID results – additional IV findings are available upon request.
7.1 Additional Robustness Tests
In Table 8, we run additional robustness tests dealing with alternative choices regard-
ing control variables, fixed effects, and estimation sample. In Panel A, we run the baseline
regression with bank and time fixed effects but without potentially collinear control vari-
ables. In Panel B, we remove the bank fixed effects to be able to use between-bank
variation instead of within-bank variation. To be able to construct the DID estimator,
we include a TARP dummy variable as well as the POSTt × TARPi variable of inter-
est. In Panels C-E, we test whether certain banks drive the main estimation results. In
Panel C, we exclude the eight banks that were involuntary TARP recipients and there-
fore may have different demands for deposits. In Panel D, we exclude the 19 banks that
participated in the 2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) stress tests
and may be under greater scrutiny. Panel E excludes small banks with GTA below $100
million as these banks may be faced with different deposit market conditions. Panels F
and G remove two different quarters from our sample that may drive the results. Panel
F deletes observations from 2008:Q4, the quarter which shortly followed the Lehman
Brothers failure shock that may have significantly affected deposit flows, and Panel G,
removes 2009:Q3, the quarter in which the Call Report redenomination of the insured
and uninsured deposits took place (see Table A1 in the Appendix).
In all cases, our results are robust to these alternative choices and indicate an overall
reduced demand for deposits by TARP banks, consistent with Hypothesis 4, “Depos-
itors Need Not Apply.”
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7.2 Effect of TARP at the Intensive Margin (TARP-iness)
Our main results identify an average shift in deposit demand for TARP banks, regard-
less of the size of the capital injection. In Table 9, we investigate whether TARP banks
receiving a more sizable injection change their demand for deposits to a larger extent.
We rerun our main regression specification using three different treatment intensity
measures instead of the TARP dummy variable before. These measures are the natural
logarithm of the TARP capital injection (Panel A), the ratio of the capital injection to
the bank’s risk-based (Tier 1 and Tier 2) capital (Panel B), and the ratio of the capital
injection to the bank’s risk-weighted assets (Panel C). We present the results in Table 9.
In all cases, deposit quantities and rates consistently show negative coefficients, sug-
gesting that banks lower their demand for deposits after the TARP capital injection,
again consistent with Hypothesis 4, “Depositors Need Not Apply.” These results
further show that not only the treatment but also the intensity of the treatment mat-
ters, e.g., the demand for deposits decreases more for banks that received higher TARP
injection amounts.
7.3 Cross-Sectional Tests
In Table 10, we assess whether depositors exhibit differential responses to TARP
capital injections that depend on their banks’ characteristics or circumstances. TARP
banks that are larger, better capitalized, operate in better local economic conditions,
or face less local market market competition may attract more deposits or experience
reduced discipline due to a perception of higher safety and soundness.
We reestimate our baseline regressions using sample splits based on the median val-
ues of bank size, bank capitalization, and market-level economic conditions. In Panel A,
we find that the demand effect we identified earlier is present for both small and large
banks. For large banks, we find strong effects for both insured deposits and total de-
posits, whereas for small banks, we only find an effect for insured deposits. This may be
because the coefficient for uninsured deposits is positive, albeit not significant, for small
banks, indicating that the demand effect of Hypothesis 4, “Depositors Need Not
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Apply” is marginally dominating the weakened market discipline effect of Hypothesis
1, “Depositors Need Not Run.”
In Panels B, C and D, we find that our main results hold for banks with both high
and low levels of capitalization, banks faced with both good and bad local economic
conditions, and banks in less and more competitive markets (low and high Deposits
HHI). We do find, however, that the downward deposit demand shift is more pronounced
for highly capitalized banks, which need less deposit funding, ceteris paribus.
8 Conclusions
Understanding whether bank bailouts significantly weaken or strengthen market dis-
cipline is an important research and policy question. Theoretically, the results could go
either way, and there is little in the way of prior empirical evidence on this point. We ad-
dress this underinvestigated issue by conducting the first empirical study of the effects of
the massive TARP bailout of U.S. banks on market discipline by depositors, who account
for the majority of bank debt. Using an extensive dataset, we measure the effects of the
bailouts on deposit quantities and prices in order to distinguish supply effects caused by
changes in market discipline from demand effects caused by bank reactions to bailouts.
We find very surprising results overall. Banks that received TARP registered out-
flows of deposits and lower deposit prices compared to non-recipient banks, consistent
with demand effects by banks dominating supply effects or market discipline decreases
or increases by depositors. These baseline results are quite robust to a wide array of
estimation strategies and robustness tests including instrumental variables, falsification
tests, matched sample analysis, and many others. Our channels analysis is suggestive
that the reason that TARP recipients choose to demand less deposits is that they appear
to shrink their assets in response to TARP and thus require fewer deposits.
These overall results, however, mask some interesting findings for three subsets of
the data – uninsured deposits, transaction deposits, and deposits held by banks that
repaid TARP early. Regression analyses suggest that these deposits temporarily increase
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in response to TARP in some cases. While we cannot draw strong conclusions from
these exceptions, these temporary deposit increases are consistent with weakened market
discipline by depositors in these cases. This finding differs from results for subordinated
debtholders in Forssbaeck and Nielsen (2016), which suggested a transitory increase in
market discipline.
Thus, while we cannot draw strong conclusions regarding overall changes in depositor
discipline from TARP, the results of investigating subsets of the data are more suggestive
of pockets of weakened rather than strengthened discipline.
Our paper contributes to the bank bailout literature by investigating for the first
time the effect of TARP bailouts on depositor discipline. We also contribute to the
market discipline literature generally by assessing effects on both quantities and prices to
distinguish between supply effects of market participants and demand effects of the banks
themselves. Our main demand effects are an important contribution to this literature in
that such demand effects are typically not considered.
Our results have important implications for the policy debate on costs and benefits of
bank bailouts and other resolution regimes for banks (e.g., see surveys by Calomiris and
Khan 2015; Berger and Roman 2020). They are also relevant for the COVID-19 crisis that
resulted in nonfinancial sector bailouts and may yet involve bank bailouts.17 Among the
social costs discussed in the bank bailouts literature is the potential weakening of market
discipline, including by depositors. Our empirical findings are suggestive of only limited
weakened depositor discipline in some of our subsamples, with any overall change in
depositor discipline empirically dominated by decreases in deposit demand by the bailed-
out banks. Thus, the undesirable decrease in market discipline from bailouts tends to be
only relatively minor.
17See Levine, Lin, Tai, and Xie (2020) for an analysis of how depositors reacted to the COVID-19 crisis.
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Figure 1: Deposit Flows and Interest Rates for TARP vs. Non-TARP Banks
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(continued on next page)
The figure shows (simple average) deposit flows and deposit rates for TARP and non-TARP banks per quarter. The vertical
line corresponds to the first quarter of 2009, the start of the treatment period. See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions
and sources of the data.
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Figure 1: Deposit Flows and Interest Rates for TARP vs. Non-TARP Banks
(Continued)
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The figure shows (simple average) deposit flows and deposit rates for TARP and non-TARP banks per quarter. The vertical
line corresponds to the first quarter of 2009, the start of the treatment period. See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions
and sources of the data.
40
Table 1: Summary Statistics
N Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75
Deposit Flows and Interest Rates
∆ ln (Total Deposits) (%) 216,803 1.53 6.79 −1.98 0.63 3.71
∆ ln (Insured Deposits) (%) 210,451 1.35 7.73 −1.86 0.23 2.77
∆ ln (Uninsured Deposits) (%) 209,645 2.49 26.67 −7.02 1.35 10.90
Excess Implicit Interest Rate (%) 218,359 −1.64 1.71 −3.26 −1.02 −0.07
Excess 12-Month 10K CD Rate (%) 168,346 0.17 0.94 −0.51 0.30 0.80
Excess 12-Month 100K CD Rate (%) 83,312 0.50 0.68 0.22 0.54 0.88
Bailout Variables
TARP 219,206 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
ln(1 + Bailout Amount) 219,206 0.88 2.81 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bailout Amount / Risk-Based Capital (%) 219,204 3.53 85.52 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bailout Amount / Risk-Weighted Assets (%) 206,037 0.32 1.46 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bank and Local Economic Conditions Variables
Capital Adequacy (%) 219,206 11.40 5.85 8.64 10.02 12.16
Asset Quality (%) 217,470 1.78 2.47 0.26 0.91 2.23
Management Quality (%) 219,165 74.71 30.44 59.44 68.93 80.83
Earnings (%) 219,193 0.16 0.40 0.10 0.22 0.33
Liquidity (%) 219,206 6.40 6.42 2.55 4.06 7.59
Sensitivity to Market Risk (%) 219,206 10.48 9.28 3.12 8.11 15.38
Ln(Total Assets) 219,206 11.99 1.32 11.13 11.87 12.67
Age 219,187 67.97 43.64 23.00 79.00 104.00
BHC 219,206 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 1.00
Local Poverty Rate (%, weighted by deposit share) 215,502 14.64 4.92 11.26 13.65 17.04
Local Median Household Income (1000$, weighted by deposit share) 215,502 45.43 10.20 38.44 44.48 51.55
Gross Regional Domestic Product per Capita (1000$, weighted by deposit share) 215,502 45.86 6.37 41.95 45.65 50.32
Local Deposit HHI (weighted by deposit share) 215,502 0.23 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.27
Instruments
House Subcommittee on Financial Markets or Capital Markets 2008/2009 219,206 0.08 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00
Democrat as Local Representative 2007/2008 219,206 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
CEO Compensation $500K+ 219,206 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00
This table shows summary statistics for variables used in the analysis. Banks are consolidated into the highest holding
company, and data are between 2004 and 2012. The unit of observation is the bank-quarter level, and income statement
variables are based on quarterly data. All data are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile, and bank-quarters in which
a merger has taken place are removed. The merger information comes from the Mergers and Acquisitions list from the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The implicit interest rates, 12-Month 10K CD rate, and 12-Month 100K CD rate are in
excess of the 1 year Treasury rate. Capital adequacy is defined as the simple equity ratio, asset quality is proxied by the
nonperforming loan ratio, management quality is proxied by the cost to income ratio, earnings are the return on assets,
liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, and sensitivity to market risk is the short-term asset and liability
mismatch to total assets ratio. See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions and sources of the data.
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Table 2: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ lnDi,t ri,t − rf,t
Insured Uninsured Implicit 12-Month 12-Month
Total Deposits Deposits Deposits Interest Rate 10K CD 100K CD
POST × TARP -0.589*** -1.395*** -0.233 -0.075*** -0.064*** -0.048*
[-4.57] [-8.73] [-0.81] [-10.23] [-3.39] [-1.66]
Capital Adequacy 0.532*** 0.591*** 0.955*** -0.001*** 0.007*** 0.005***
[39.61] [35.58] [30.31] [-3.02] [6.37] [3.90]
Asset Quality -0.368*** -0.367*** -0.474*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.007***
[-31.51] [-27.03] [-12.94] [-9.59] [-9.35] [-5.48]
Management Quality 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.000*** -0.000 0.000
[1.33] [0.76] [1.44] [9.29] [-1.44] [0.87]
Earnings -0.062 -0.745*** 1.155*** -0.017*** -0.003 -0.001
[-0.88] [-8.15] [3.85] [-8.29] [-0.61] [-0.23]
Liquidity -0.131*** -0.059*** -0.338*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.004***
[-22.25] [-9.79] [-17.86] [-2.80] [-4.37] [-7.06]
Sensitivity to Market Risk 0.013*** 0.004 0.066*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*
[4.35] [1.35] [6.45] [2.65] [0.24] [1.67]
Ln(Total Assets) -5.900*** -4.184*** -10.972*** 0.114*** -0.057*** -0.003
[-30.19] [-18.82] [-25.87] [13.64] [-3.77] [-0.16]
Age 0.003 -0.006 0.029** -0.000* 0.000 0.001
[0.63] [-1.10] [2.50] [-1.68] [0.70] [0.94]
BHC 0.018 -0.024 -0.598 0.032*** -0.061** 0.001
[0.08] [-0.10] [-1.17] [2.97] [-2.29] [0.02]
Local Poverty Rate -0.052*** -0.060*** -0.002 -0.002** -0.005*** -0.000
[-3.47] [-3.43] [-0.04] [-2.51] [-2.84] [-0.22]
Local Median Household Income 0.034*** 0.049*** 0.123*** 0.001*** 0.007*** 0.003**
[2.69] [3.53] [3.43] [2.84] [5.50] [2.26]
Gross Regional Domestic Product per Capita 0.061*** 0.065*** -0.007 -0.001 0.003* 0.009***
[3.76] [3.49] [-0.16] [-1.40] [1.93] [4.05]
Local Deposit HHI 0.681 1.018 -0.216 -0.015 0.030 0.013
[1.01] [1.31] [-0.11] [-0.55] [0.43] [0.13]
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.167 0.117 0.026 0.050 0.014 0.012
No. of obs 206,845 200,858 199,810 206,844 162,787 82,158
No. of clusters 7,662 7,659 7,661 7,662 6,437 5,430
This table shows results for estimations analyzing the impact of TARP on the supply and demand for deposits. Columns
(1)-(3) show results for different deposit flows, and columns (4)-(6) show results for different deposit rates. TARP is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank received TARP support under the Capital Purchase Program, and POST is a
dummy variable equal to 1 between 2009-2012. All estimations include lagged bank-level and lagged market-level control
variables, as well as bank and time fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. The control variables are the same
as shown in Table 1 and are defined in Table A1 in the Appendix. t-statistics are reported in square brackets, based on
standard errors clustered by bank. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
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Table 3: Endogeneity and Sample Selection Analyses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ lnDi,t ri,t − rf,t
Insured Uninsured Implicit 12-Month 12-Month
Total Deposits Deposits Deposits Interest Rate 10K CD 100K CD
Panel A: IV
POST × TARP -1.795*** -5.502*** 0.088 -0.355*** -0.402*** -0.431***
[-5.29] [-11.37] [0.11] [-12.86] [-8.52] [-6.79]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 38679.3 37645.9 37547.1 38680.8 35415.1 20341.7
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 564.9 562.7 563.0 564.9 508.6 291.4
Within-R̄2 0.166 0.109 0.026 -0.064 -0.007 -0.028
No. of obs 206,845 200,858 199,810 206,844 162,787 82,158
No. of clusters 7,662 7,659 7,661 7,662 6,437 5,430
Panel B: Exact TARP Injection Dates
POST-EXACT × TARP -0.562*** -1.262*** -0.518* -0.076*** -0.061*** -0.046
[-4.32] [-8.03] [-1.79] [-10.32] [-3.22] [-1.61]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.167 0.116 0.026 0.050 0.014 0.012
No. of obs 206,845 200,858 199,810 206,844 162,787 82,158
No. of clusters 7,662 7,659 7,661 7,662 6,437 5,430
Panel C: Matched Sample Regression
POST × TARP -0.428** -0.761*** -0.112 -0.049*** -0.006 0.017
[-2.47] [-3.30] [-0.28] [-5.17] [-0.23] [0.40]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R̄2 0.192 0.116 0.053 0.063 0.013 0.013
No. of obs 31,745 30,772 30,689 31,744 25,814 15,871
No. of clusters 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 936 893
Panel D: Falsification Test
POST × TARP -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001
90% Confidence Interval [−0.204; 0.208] [−0.235; 0.224] [−0.553; 0.496] [−0.011; 0.010] [−0.030; 0.028] [−0.055; 0.057]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table shows robustness tests dealing with endogeneity and sample selection issues for analyzing the impact of TARP
on the supply and demand for deposits. Panel A shows results for instrumental variable estimations, where TARP is
instrumented in a first-stage probit regression with political connections variables shown in Table A2 in the Appendix.
Panel B shows the estimation when redefining the POST period to be the quarter in which the bank received TARP,
instead of letting TARP start in 2009:Q1. Panel C shows the results for matched sample regressions, where we obtain a
matched sample of TARP and non-TARP banks based on Mahalanobis Distance Matching on bank-level and market-level
control variables in 2007:Q4. See Table A3 in the Appendix for more information on the matching procedure and outcome.
Panel D shows the results for a falsification test where we randomly assign TARP 1,000 times to banks in 2009:Q1, keeping
the proportion of banks that received TARP similar, and afterward run the baseline OLS regression. From the 1,000
repetitions we show the mean, the 5th and 95th percentile coefficients. In Panels A, B and C, t-statistics are reported in
square brackets, based on standard errors clustered by bank. In Panel D, 90% confidence intervals are shown in square
brackets. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
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Table 4: Dynamics of the Effects by Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ lnDi,t ri,t − rf,t
Insured Uninsured Implicit 12-Month 12-Month
Total Deposits Deposits Deposits Interest Rate 10K CD 100K CD
Panel A: OLS Estimates
2009 × TARP 0.199 -1.228*** 1.197** -0.052*** -0.080*** -0.059*
[1.27] [-4.57] [2.15] [-7.28] [-4.03] [-1.95]
2010 × TARP -0.663*** -1.296*** 0.257 -0.074*** -0.084*** -0.074**
[-4.21] [-6.87] [0.56] [-10.06] [-4.17] [-2.44]
2011 × TARP -0.920*** -1.431*** -0.816** -0.083*** -0.055*** -0.039
[-5.79] [-7.77] [-2.02] [-10.65] [-2.70] [-1.34]
2012 × TARP -1.073*** -1.614*** -1.404*** -0.095*** -0.036* -0.015
[-6.52] [-9.08] [-3.66] [-11.40] [-1.73] [-0.51]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.167 0.117 0.026 0.050 0.014 0.013
No. of obs 206,845 200,858 199,810 206,844 162,787 82,158
No. of clusters 7,662 7,659 7,661 7,662 6,437 5,430
Panel B: IV Estimates
2009 × TARP 0.011 -5.526*** 2.078 -0.291*** -0.447*** -0.453***
[0.03] [-8.02] [1.42] [-11.45] [-8.78] [-6.30]
2010 × TARP -2.316*** -5.172*** 0.661 -0.365*** -0.540*** -0.573***
[-6.15] [-9.82] [0.54] [-13.10] [-10.42] [-8.43]
2011 × TARP -2.627*** -5.926*** 0.420 -0.373*** -0.361*** -0.400***
[-6.16] [-11.08] [0.38] [-12.84] [-7.36] [-6.37]
2012 × TARP -2.452*** -5.410*** -2.675** -0.399*** -0.234*** -0.277***
[-5.42] [-9.76] [-2.47] [-12.49] [-4.87] [-4.53]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 9516.1 9163.7 9135.2 9516.2 8768.0 4735.0
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 141.8 139.9 139.9 141.8 128.2 103.6
Within-R̄2 0.166 0.109 0.026 -0.065 -0.010 -0.038
No. of obs 206,845 200,858 199,810 206,844 162,787 82,158
No. of clusters 7,662 7,659 7,661 7,662 6,437 5,430
This table shows the dynamics of the impact of TARP on the supply and demand for deposits by splitting the POST
period in underlying years. As the unit of observation is at the bank-quarter level, these coefficients show the average
quarterly deposit flows and deposit rates that TARP banks experience compared to non-TARP banks in specific years of
the TARP period. t-statistics are reported in square brackets, based on standard errors clustered by bank. * significant at
10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
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Table 5: Early Repayment of TARP Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ lnDi,t ri,t − rf,t
Insured Uninsured Implicit 12-Month 12-Month
Total Deposits Deposits Deposits Interest Rate 10K CD 100K CD
Panel A: OLS Estimates
POST × TARP Not Repaid Early -0.820*** -1.705*** -0.543* -0.073*** -0.077*** -0.047
[-5.88] [-9.62] [-1.72] [-8.84] [-3.73] [-1.45]
POST × TARP Repaid Early 0.381 -0.086 1.072* -0.084*** -0.016 -0.053
[1.36] [-0.27] [1.85] [-6.17] [-0.35] [-0.89]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.167 0.117 0.026 0.050 0.014 0.012
No. of obs 206,845 200,858 199,810 206,844 162,787 82,158
No. of clusters 7,662 7,659 7,661 7,662 6,437 5,430
Panel B: IV Estimates
POST × TARP Not Repaid Early -6.271*** -13.732*** -5.230*** -0.654*** -0.995*** -0.662***
[-8.04] [-11.18] [-2.99] [-10.52] [-8.04] [-4.49]
POST × TARP Repaid Early 4.525*** 6.473*** 7.252*** 0.122 0.510** -0.084
[3.74] [3.05] [3.60] [1.24] [2.43] [-0.49]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 4189.4 4140.7 4141.0 4189.7 3288.3 1638.6
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 54.8 55.4 55.7 54.8 38.0 23.1
Within-R̄2 0.150 0.058 0.025 -0.381 -0.130 -0.072
No. of obs 206,845 200,858 199,810 206,844 162,787 82,158
No. of clusters 7,662 7,659 7,661 7,662 6,437 5,430
This table shows the differential impact of TARP on the supply and demand for deposits by banks that repaid TARP early
and those that did not. The banks that receive TARP are split in (1) banks that repaid TARP early in 2009 or 2010, and
(2) banks that did not repay early. In Panel A, we perform this analysis with the baseline OLS regressions, and in Panel
B, we use the variables House Subcommittee on Financial Markets or Capital Markets 2008/2009, Democrat as Local
Representative 2007/2008, and CEO Compensation $500K as instruments for TARP. The first-stage probit estimations
can be found in Table A2 columns (2) and (3). t-statistics are reported in square brackets, based on standard errors






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Underlying Channels Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Gross Total ∆ Nondeposit
Assets Liabilities ∆ Equity
Panel A: OLS Estimates
POST × TARP -0.633*** -1.496*** 0.512***
[-5.63] [-3.95] [4.25]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.160 0.008 0.077
No. of obs 206,848 205,943 206,848
No. of clusters 7,662 7,657 7,662
Panel B: IV Estimates
POST × TARP -2.124*** -0.829 -1.114***
[-6.92] [-0.86] [-3.11]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 38690.0 38476.5 38690.0
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 565.1 564.0 565.1
Within-R̄2 0.157 0.008 0.075
No. of obs 206,848 205,943 206,848
No. of clusters 7,662 7,657 7,662
This table explores the different ways in which TARP banks alter their capital structure. Specifically, we l ook at whether 
TARP banks’ Gross Total Assets (column 1), Nondeposit Liabilities (column 2), and Equity (column 3) change compared to 
non-TARP banks. In Panel A, we show the results from baseline OLS regressions, and in Panel B, we show the 
instrumental variables regressions. t-statistics are reported in square brackets, based on standard errors clustered by bank. 
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
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Table 8: Additional Robustness Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ lnDi,t ri,t − rf,t
Insured Uninsured Implicit 12-Month 12-Month
Total Deposits Deposits Deposits Interest Rate 10K CD 100K CD
Panel A: Exclude Controls
POST × TARP -1.819*** -2.377*** -2.234*** -0.057*** -0.082*** -0.053*
[-9.79] [-10.19] [-6.38] [-7.78] [-4.45] [-1.84]
Bank and Market Controls No No No No No No
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.001
No. of obs 216,692 210,338 209,533 218,242 168,203 83,190
No. of clusters 7,867 7,847 7,864 7,891 6,520 5,469
Panel B: Exclude Bank Fixed Effects
TARP 0.967*** 1.121*** 1.272*** 0.045*** 0.011 0.012
[9.32] [9.18] [7.49] [4.48] [0.49] [0.39]
POST × TARP -1.301*** -1.837*** -1.389*** -0.074*** -0.086*** -0.062**
[-10.94] [-11.98] [-5.79] [-10.57] [-4.42] [-2.03]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects No No No No No No
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.148 0.120 0.018 0.147 0.043 0.055
No. of obs 206,957 200,969 199,921 206,956 162,933 82,290
No. of clusters 7,774 7,770 7,772 7,774 6,583 5,562
Panel C: Remove Involuntary Banks
POST × TARP -0.602*** -1.432*** -0.255 -0.073*** -0.064*** -0.047
[-4.65] [-8.97] [-0.88] [-9.97] [-3.34] [-1.61]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.167 0.117 0.026 0.051 0.014 0.012
No. of obs 206,666 200,691 199,637 206,665 162,695 82,070
No. of clusters 7,654 7,651 7,653 7,654 6,432 5,425
Panel D: Remove SCAP Participants
POST × TARP -0.601*** -1.413*** -0.265 -0.071*** -0.061*** -0.041
[-4.61] [-8.86] [-0.91] [-9.73] [-3.16] [-1.39]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.168 0.117 0.026 0.051 0.014 0.012
No. of obs 206,402 200,433 199,379 206,401 162,479 81,860
No. of clusters 7,644 7,641 7,643 7,644 6,424 5,417
(continued on next page)
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Table 8: Additional Robustness Tests
(Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ lnDi,t ri,t − rf,t
Insured Uninsured Implicit 12-Month 12-Month
Total Deposits Deposits Deposits Interest Rate 10K CD 100K CD
Panel E: Exclude Small Banks (< $ 100 million)
POST × TARP -0.376*** -1.144*** -0.016 -0.054*** -0.034* -0.025
[-2.80] [-6.80] [-0.05] [-8.43] [-1.69] [-0.84]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.118 0.051 0.024 0.039 0.010 0.012
No. of obs 133,380 129,398 129,160 133,379 110,814 62,340
No. of clusters 5,471 5,468 5,469 5,471 4,696 4,054
Panel F: Exclude 2008:Q4
POST × TARP -0.606*** -1.386*** -0.405 -0.078*** -0.061*** -0.043
[-4.57] [-8.38] [-1.42] [-9.97] [-3.10] [-1.40]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.169 0.119 0.026 0.051 0.014 0.012
No. of obs 200,875 194,890 193,851 200,874 158,187 80,827
No. of clusters 7,658 7,655 7,657 7,658 6,432 5,427
Panel G: Exclude 2009:Q3
POST × TARP -0.666*** -1.395*** -0.233 -0.077*** -0.063*** -0.049*
[-5.12] [-8.73] [-0.81] [-10.34] [-3.31] [-1.69]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.168 0.117 0.026 0.050 0.014 0.012
No. of obs 200,934 200,858 199,810 200,933 158,048 79,766
No. of clusters 7,662 7,659 7,661 7,662 6,432 5,417
This table shows multiple robustness tests for choices regarding control variables, fixed effects, and estimation sample. Panel
A reports regressions with both bank and time fixed effects but without controls variables. Panel B reports regressions
without bank fixed effects but with time fixed effects and the bank and market control variables, and in these regressions
the TARP dummy is included next to the POST × TARP variable of interest. In Panels C - E, we test whether certain
banks drive the main estimations results, and run baseline regressions while excluding the eight banks that were involuntary
recipients of TARP (Panel C), the 19 banks that participated in the 2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP)
stress tests (Panel D), and small banks with gross total assets below $100 million (Panel E). Furthermore, in Panel F, we
remove the crisis quarter 2008:Q4, and due to the increase in deposit insurance level and subsequent change in reporting
in 2009:Q3 (see Table A1 for more information), we run the baseline regressions while excluding 2009:Q3 in Panel G.
t-statistics are reported in square brackets, based on standard errors clustered by bank. * significant at 10 percent; **
significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
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Table 9: TARP Intensive Margin (TARP-iness)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ lnDi,t ri,t − rf,t
Insured Uninsured Implicit 12-Month 12-Month
Total Deposits Deposits Deposits Interest Rate 10K CD 100K CD
Panel A: Ln(1 + Bailout Amount)
POST × LN(1 + BAILOUT) -0.036*** -0.085*** -0.014 -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003*
[-4.71] [-8.81] [-0.83] [-11.13] [-3.28] [-1.85]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.167 0.117 0.026 0.050 0.014 0.012
No. of obs 206,845 200,858 199,810 206,844 162,787 82,158
No. of clusters 7,662 7,659 7,661 7,662 6,437 5,430
Panel B: Bailout / Risk-Based Capital
POST × BAILOUT/Risk-Based Capital -2.849*** -4.388*** -3.456*** -0.210*** -0.145** -0.092
[-6.16] [-6.86] [-2.81] [-7.28] [-2.46] [-1.39]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.167 0.116 0.026 0.047 0.014 0.012
No. of obs 206,843 200,856 199,808 206,842 162,786 82,158
No. of clusters 7,662 7,659 7,661 7,662 6,437 5,430
Panel B: Bailout / Risk-Weighted Assets
POST × BAILOUT/Risk-Weighted Assets -0.334*** -0.512*** -0.311*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.012
[-9.03] [-10.25] [-3.66] [-6.30] [-3.12] [-1.48]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.170 0.114 0.027 0.050 0.014 0.012
No. of obs 197,879 192,201 191,563 197,878 158,693 80,943
No. of clusters 7,426 7,426 7,426 7,426 6,312 5,341
This table explores the intensive margin of the TARP bailouts, by allowing the size of the treatment to vary. The panel
shows regressions when defining the TARP bailouts to be equal to (1) Ln(1 + Bailout Amount), (2) Bailout Amount /
Risk-based Capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2), and (3) Bailout Amount / Risk-Weighted Assets. We obtain similar results when
using Bailout Amount / Gross Total Assets or Bailout Amount / Total Equity. t-statistics are reported in square brackets,
based on standard errors clustered by bank. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1
percent.
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Table 10: Cross-Sectional Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ lnDi,t ri,t − rf,t
Insured Uninsured Implicit 12-Month 12-Month
Total Deposits Deposits Deposits Interest Rate 10K CD 100K CD
Panel A: Sample Split by Median Bank Size in 2008:Q3
Small Banks
POST × TARP -0.089 -1.254*** 1.320 -0.116*** -0.197*** -0.305***
[-0.22] [-2.78] [1.38] [-3.16] [-4.70] [-4.05]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.179 0.148 0.024 0.075 0.016 0.022
No. of obs 103,820 100,931 100,082 103,820 76,143 30,980
No. of clusters 4,547 4,543 4,544 4,547 3,570 2,577
Large Banks
POST × TARP -0.523*** -1.166*** -0.411 -0.049*** -0.014 -0.019
[-4.02] [-6.88] [-1.39] [-7.03] [-0.63] [-0.61]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.082 0.030 0.018 0.033 0.010 0.011
No. of obs 102,868 99,767 99,568 102,867 86,509 51,074
No. of clusters 4,338 4,333 4,334 4,338 3,740 3,282
Panel B: Sample Split by Median Bank Capitalization in 2008:Q3
Lowly Capitalized Banks
POST × TARP -0.398*** -0.942*** 0.043 -0.056*** -0.025 -0.011
[-2.69] [-5.60] [0.11] [-6.48] [-1.03] [-0.27]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.072 0.022 0.014 0.058 0.009 0.008
No. of obs 103,486 100,395 99,924 103,485 84,473 42,249
No. of clusters 5,511 5,501 5,497 5,511 4,631 3,573
Highly Capitalized Banks
POST × TARP -0.616** -1.864*** -0.060 -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.094**
[-2.45] [-5.75] [-0.11] [-9.41] [-2.94] [-2.06]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.181 0.145 0.029 0.037 0.014 0.015
No. of obs 102,824 99,919 99,342 102,824 77,835 39,427
No. of clusters 5,773 5,762 5,762 5,773 4,695 3,677
(continued on next page)
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Table 10: Cross-Sectional Tests
(Continued)
∆ lnDi,t ri,t − rf,t
Insured Uninsured Implicit 12-Month 12-Month
Total Deposits Deposits Deposits Interest Rate 10K CD 100K CD
Panel C: Sample Split by Median Gross Regional Domestic Product per Capita in 2008:Q3
Low Gross Regional Domestic Product per Capita
POST × TARP -0.796*** -1.307*** -0.824** -0.067*** -0.043* 0.002
[-4.62] [-5.89] [-2.00] [-9.48] [-1.72] [0.05]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.172 0.119 0.025 0.054 0.023 0.030
No. of obs 106,530 103,179 102,735 106,529 86,614 41,349
No. of clusters 4,472 4,468 4,468 4,472 3,837 3,051
High Gross Regional Domestic Product per Capita
POST × TARP -0.374* -1.452*** 0.217 -0.081*** -0.089*** -0.095***
[-1.95] [-6.28] [0.52] [-6.40] [-3.12] [-2.75]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.155 0.105 0.025 0.047 0.011 0.009
No. of obs 100,286 97,649 97,043 100,286 76,150 40,791
No. of clusters 4,308 4,305 4,307 4,308 3,499 2,873
Panel D: Sample Split by Deposit Market HHI 2008:Q3
Low Deposit Market HHI
POST × TARP -0.546*** -1.525*** -0.029 -0.069*** -0.048* -0.026
[-2.93] [-6.56] [-0.08] [-6.12] [-1.84] [-0.72]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.197 0.136 0.033 0.051 0.018 0.013
No. of obs 100,668 97,644 97,195 100,667 78,095 41,048
No. of clusters 4,536 4,531 4,533 4,536 3,734 2,988
High Deposit Market HHI
POST × TARP -0.441** -1.053*** -0.041 -0.085*** -0.065** -0.065
[-2.41] [-4.60] [-0.08] [-9.36] [-2.31] [-1.34]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-R̄2 0.107 0.061 0.018 0.059 0.005 0.011
No. of obs 105,890 102,949 102,350 105,890 84,440 40,892
No. of clusters 4,502 4,501 4,498 4,502 3,755 3,042
This table shows the differential impact of TARP on the supply and demand for deposits by banks based on their observable
characteristics by performing split sample regressions. We base the split samples on the median observation of bank
characteristics in 2008:Q3, so before the TARP bailouts were in place. Panel A shows split sample regressions for large
and small banks, based on the size distribution of 2008:Q3. Panel B shows split sample regressions for high and lowly
capitalized banks based on the simple equity ratio distribution in 2008:Q3. Panel C shows split sample regressions for
banks that are exposed mainly to markets with a low or high gross regional domestic product per capita based on the
distribution in 2008:Q3. Panel D shows split sample regressions for banks that are exposed mainly to markets with a low
or high deposit market competition (measured by the deposit market HHI) in 2008:Q3. t-statistics are reported in square




Table A1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition Source
Bailout Variables
TARP A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank received TARP capital support and 0
otherwise.
U.S. Department of Trea-
sury
TARP Repaid Early A dummy variable equal to 1 for banks that received TARP and repaid early in
2009 or 2010, and 0 otherwise.
U.S. Department of Trea-
sury
TARP Not Repaid Early A dummy variable equal to 1 for banks that received TARP and did not repaid
early in 2009 or 2010, and 0 otherwise.
U.S. Department of Trea-
sury
Ln(1+Bailout Amount) The natural logarithm of one plus the dollar bailout amount for banks receiving
TARP. This is 0 for non-TARP banks.
U.S. Department of Trea-
sury
Bailout Amount / Risk-
Based Capital
The dollar bailout amount divided by the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 regulatory
capital.
U.S. Department of Trea-
sury, Call Reports
Bailout Amount / Risk-
Weighted Assets
The dollar bailout amount divided by the amount of Risk-Weighted Assets. U.S. Department of Trea-
sury, Call Reports
POST A dummy variable equal to 1 in the period 2009-2012 and 0 otherwise.
Deposit Flows and Interest Rates
∆ ln (Total Deposits) Quarterly log change in bank total deposits from t− 1 to t. Call Reports
∆ ln (Insured Deposits) Quarterly log change in insured deposits from t−1 to t. Insured deposits are calcu-
lated as the amount in deposit accounts under the deposit insurance limit (before
2008Q4 $100K, afterward $250K) plus the number of deposit accounts above the
deposit insurance limit multiplied with the insured amount. After 2008:Q4, the in-
sured deposits also include the deposits under the Transaction Account Guarantee
(TAG) program, which provided unlimited deposit insurance for non-interest bear-
ing transaction accounts. With the increase in deposit insurance limit only being
reflected in Call Report items in 2009:Q3, we remove this quarter when calculating
the quarterly insured and uninsured growth rates.
Call Reports
∆ ln (Uninsured Deposits) Quarterly log change in uninsured deposits from t− 1 to t. Uninsured deposits are Call Reports
Implicit Interest Rate Call Reports, St. Louis
FRED Economic Data
12-Month 10K CD Rate
calculated as the amount in deposit accounts over the deposit insurance limit (before 
2008:Q4 $100,000, afterward $250,000) minus the number of deposit accounts above 
the deposit insurance limit multiplied with the insured amount. After 2008:Q4, 
the uninsured deposits are adjusted to exclude the deposits under the Transaction 
Account Guarantee (TAG) program, which provided unlimited deposit insurance for 
non-interest bearing transaction accounts. With the increase in deposit insurance 
limit only being reflected in Call Report i tems in 2009:Q3, we remove this quarter 
when calculating the quarterly insured and uninsured growth rates.
Total interest expense minus services charges on deposit accounts divided by total 
deposits. In excess of the 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (DGS1).
The 12-month 10K CD obtained from RateWatch. The rates are assigned to branch 
offices in the Summary of Deposits using the unique branch identifier uninumbr. 
The branch-level rates are aggregated to the bank-level by weighting with the last 
known branch deposit share to total bank deposits from the Summary of Deposits. 
In excess of the 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (DGS1).
RateWatch, Summary of
Deposits, St. Louis FRED
Economic Data
12-Month 100K CD Rate The 12-month 100K CD obtained from RateWatch. The rates are assigned to
branch offices in the Summary of Deposits using the unique branch identifier un-
inumbr. The branch-level rates are aggregated to the bank-level by weighting with
the last known branch deposit share to total bank deposits from the Summary of
Deposits. In excess of the 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (DGS1).
RateWatch, Summary of
Deposits, St. Louis FRED
Economic Data
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∆ ln (Term Deposits) Quarterly log change in term deposits from t− 1 to t. Term deposits are calculated
as the sum of insured and uninsured term deposits. Due to a change in the report-
ing of term deposits in the Call Reports in 2010Q1, we remove this quarter when
calculating the quarterly growth rates.
Call Reports
Term Deposits Rate Total term deposit interest expense divided by total term deposits. In excess of the
1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (DGS1).
Call Reports
∆ ln (Insured Term De-
posits)
Quarterly log change in insured term deposits from t − 1 to t. Due to a change
in the reporting of term deposits in the Call Reports in 2010Q1, we remove this




Total insured term deposit interest expense divided by total insured term deposits.
In excess of the 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (DGS1).
Call Reports
∆ ln (Uninsured Term De-
posits)
Quarterly log change in uninsured term deposits from t − 1 to t. Due to a change
in the reporting of term deposits in the Call Reports in 2010Q1, we remove this




Total uninsured term deposit interest expense divided by total uninsured term de-
posits. In excess of the 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (DGS1).
Call Reports
∆ ln (Savings Deposits) Quarterly log change in savings deposits from t − 1 to t. Savings deposits are
calculated as the sum of money market deposit accounts and other non-transaction
savings deposits.
Call Reports
Savings Deposits Rate Total savings deposit interest expense divided by total savings deposits. In excess
of the 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (DGS1).
Call Reports
∆ ln (Transaction De-
posits)
Quarterly log change in transactions deposits from t− 1 to t. Call Reports
Transaction Deposits Rate Total transaction deposit interest expense divided by total transaction deposits. In
excess of the 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (DGS1).
Call Reports
Bank and Market Control Variables
Capital Adequacy Capitalization ratio calculated as total equity capital divided by gross total assets. Call Reports
Asset Quality Ratio of non-performing loans (90 days or more past due and loans that are no
longer accruing interest) to total loans.
Call Reports
Management Quality Ratio of non-interest expenses to total interest income and non-interest income. Call Reports
Earnings Ratio of annualized net income to total assets. Call Reports
Liquidity Ratio of bank liquid assets to gross total assets. Call Reports
Sensitivity to Market Risk The absolute difference (gap) between short-term assets and short-term liabilities
divided by gross total assets.
Call Reports
Ln(Total Assets) Natural logarithm of gross total assets (total assets plus the loan allowance for loan




Table A1: Variable Definitions
(Continued)
Variable Definition Source
Bank and Local Economic Conditions Variables
Age The age (in years) of the bank or the oldest bank owned by the bank holding
company based on its reported opening date.
Call Reports
BHC Dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is a Bank Holding Company (BHC). Call Reports
Local Poverty Rate The U.S. Census county poverty rate, aggregated to the bank-level by weighting
with the last known branch deposit share to total bank deposits from the Summary
of Deposits.




The U.S. Census median county household income, aggregated to the bank-level by
weighting with the last known branch deposit share to total bank deposits from the
Summary of Deposits.




The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Gross Domestic Product by county, ag-
gregated to the bank-level by weighting with the last known branch deposit share
to total bank deposits from the Summary of Deposits.
Summary of Deposits, BEA
Local Deposit HHI Deposit based Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of local market concentration per
county, aggregated to the bank-level by weighting with the last known branch de-




Financial Markets or Cap-
ital Markets 2008/2009
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is headquartered in a district of a House
member who served on the Capital Markets Subcommittee or the Financial Insti-
tutions Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee in 2008 or 2009.
Center for Responsive Pol-
itics, House of Representa-
tives website, Missouri Cen-
sus Data Center
Democrat as Local Repre-
sentative 2007/2008
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is headquartered in a district where the
local representative was a Democrat in the 2007/2008 campaign election cycle.
Center for Responsive Pol-
itics, House of Representa-








Table A2: First-Stage Probit Models
(1) (2) (3)
TARP TARP
TARP Not Repaid Repaid Early
House Subcommittee on Financial Markets or Capital Markets 2008/2009 0.099*** 0.071*** 0.156***
[5.34] [3.67] [4.96]
Democrat as Local Representative 2007/2008 0.089*** 0.066*** 0.056***
[9.96] [7.15] [3.41]
CEO Compensation ($500k+) 0.183*** 1.065***
[8.89] [41.13]
Bank and Market Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo- R2 0.212 0.153 0.315
No. of obs 209,070 209,070 209,070
This table shows the first-stage probit models that serve as an input for the instrumental variables approach. The following
instruments are used to predict which banks received TARP: House Subcommittee on Financial Markets or Capital Markets
2008/2009 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is headquartered in a district of a House member who served on the
Capital Markets Subcommittee or the Financial Institutions Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee in
2008 or 2009, and Democrat as Local Representative 2007/2008 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is headquartered
in a district where the local representative was a Democrat in the 2007/2008 campaign election cycle. Following Berger
and Roman (2015), in the second-stage 2SLS regression TARP is instrumented by T̂ARP from the first stage. Moreover,
we use CEO Compensation $500K to instrument for the early repayment of TARP. CEO Compensation $500K is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank’s CEO had a total compensation greater than $500K, as banks with a high CEO
compensation have been shown to be more likely to exit the TARP program (see, e.g., Wilson and Wu 2012).
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Table A3: Comparison Control and Treatment Group, Mahalanobis Distance
Matching in 2007:Q4
Control Treated Difference
Capital Adequacy 10.76 10.75 0.01
Asset Quality 0.91 0.95 -0.04
Management Quality 75.83 76.69 -0.86
Earnings 0.13 0.10 0.03
Liquidity 3.27 3.23 0.04
Sensitivity to Market Risk 8.54 9.27 -0.73
Ln(Total Assets) 12.87 13.27 -0.40***
Age 52.94 53.27 -0.33
BHC 0.81 0.83 -0.02
Local Poverty Rate 12.78 12.80 -0.02
Local Median Household Income 50.90 51.99 -1.09
Gross Regional Domestic Product per Capita 47.84 48.18 -0.34
Local Deposit HHI 0.19 0.19 0.00
This table shows the outcome of the matching to obtain a matched sample for analyses in Table 3 Panel C. We
matched the banks on the above characteristics in 2007:Q4 using Mahalanobis Distance Matching, and track
the treated and control banks throughout the sample period. The matching procedure could not find a match
for all treated banks, so the sample is not balanced. We perform simple t-tests to see if the matched banks
are similar in 2007:Q4 and report the outcome of the t-tests in the last column. * significant at 10 percent; **
significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
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